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OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
This matter comes before us on appeal from the District Court’s dismissal of 
Island Green, LLC’s complaint.  The District Court ruled that Island Green’s complaint 
failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Virgin Islands Probate Code and 
was prematurely filed in light of the provisions of the Code requiring notice to an estate 
of the nature of a claim and an opportunity for the Probate Court to consider and rule on 
the claim.  To the extent that the complaint sets forth claims against the Estate of Joseph 
A. Bryan, or persons acting on its behalf – namely, the Executrix of the Estate, Carmen 
Querrard – the District Court’s opinion and order will be affirmed.  However, to the 
extent the complaint asserts claims against other persons or entities, we will vacate and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 As we write for the parties, we will not recount either the history of the numerous 
land transactions that pertain to the grant and continued existence of an easement over 
Parcel No. 3,
1
 purportedly held by the Bryan Estate, or the complaint’s allegations as to 
                                              
     
1
Over time, this easement has also been referred to as “Easement A” and “Easement A 
on the Eastern Half of Inner Brass Island as depicted on OLG Map No. D9-7748-4006.  
In early conveyances, “Parcel No. 2” was referred to as “Parcel 1-1.”   
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the wrongs inflicted upon Island Green by the many named Defendants including Carmen 
Querrard as executrix.   
 Curiously, the Estate is not a named Defendant, but we conclude, as did the 
District Court, that the allegations made against Querrard, and others, when acting on 
behalf of, or as representative of, the Estate, set forth claims against the Estate which 
should have been presented first to the executrix as part of the Probate Court’s 
proceedings.  Clearly, the claims seeking to nullify the easement and enjoin its 
enforcement fall into that category.  Accordingly, Counts I and II
2
 were properly 
dismissed by the District Court.   
 However, the complaint also sets forth many additional claims for relief, naming 
“the Defendants”3 generally, and, in some instances, Ethel Bryan specifically, 
individually, or as “representative,” as having committed the objectionable acts.4  We 
cannot determine from the pleadings precisely who is alleged to have done what.  For 
                                              
     
2
Count I sought a declaratory judgment that there is no easement across Parcel No. 3 
for the benefit of Parcel No. 2.  Count II sought injunctive relief, claiming that Island 
Green is entitled to an order permanently enjoining defendants from recording any 
documents claiming any rights to an easement across Parcel No. 3 for the benefit of 
Parcel No. 2.   
 
     
3The “Defendants” named in the complaint are:  Carmen Theresa Bryan Querrard, 
Individually and as the Executrix of Joseph A. Bryan, Joseph Frederick Bryan, Esannon 
Noreen Bryan, Victor Melvin Bryan, Edmund Albertty Bryan, Lucille Peggy Bryan 
Capozzoli, Leroy James Bryan, Beverly Edris Bryan Kolet, Terry Mary Bryan Lenga, 
Ivan Clement Bryan, Ethel Loretta Bryan, William Billy Bryan, and Francis Bryan. 
 
     
4
The remainder of Island Green’s complaint alleged the following causes of action:  
slander of title (Count III), Defamation (Count IV), Intentional Interference with 
Business Relations (Count V), Abuse of Process (Count VI), Trespass and Trespass by 
Injury to Trees, Timber and Shrubs (Count VII).   
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instance, in Count III, Island Green objects to the recordation of a map with the contested 
easement designated as D9-7748-4006 and to the filing of a Notice of Interest against 
Parcel No. 3, but complains that “[t]he actions of Defendants, and each of them, in 
causing to be recorded various documents claiming the existence of an easement across 
Parcel No. 3 constitute slander of title and abuse of process.”  But what role did each of 
the Defendants play in “causing” these instruments to be recorded?  We are left without a 
clue.   
We must conclude that, to the extent the complaint sets forth acts of the “the 
Defendants,” it fails to state a claim, for as noted by Defendants, it fails to state anything 
that the numerous heirs did or did not do, other than receiving certain distributions from 
the Estate.  Further, Island Green has taken the position that it is not seeking 
disgorgement.  Thus, we are at a loss to define what role Island Green is contending the 
Defendants other than Querrard and Ethel Bryan may have played.  These allegations 
cannot withstand Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).     
 Accordingly, the District Court should give Island Green the opportunity to amend 
its pleadings and re-plead specifically what wrongful conduct was committed and by 
whom.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave [to amend] 
when justice so requires.”); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (“If the underlying 
facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he 
ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits.”); Newark Branch, 
NAACP v. Town of Harrison, New Jersey, 907 F.2d 1408, 1417 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[C]ourts 
have held that grants for leave to amend complaints should be routinely granted to 
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plaintiffs, even after judgments of dismissal have been entered against them, if the 
appropriate standard for leave to amend under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) is satisfied.”); 
Mittleman v. Untied States, 104 F.3d 410, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (sua sponte remanding 
case to district court with instructions to allow plaintiff to “refine” negligence and 
emotional distress claims).  If the “actor” at fault in each alleged act was really the Estate, 
then those claims, too, should have been presented first to the executrix in the Probate 
Court.
5
  All of the remaining counts – besides Counts I and II – suffer from this infirmity, 
as it cannot be determined which of the “Defendants” – a group which, as noted above, 
could include persons acting on behalf of the Estate – Island Green contends committed 
the act in question and which specific acts were committed by each.   
 In their motion to dismiss, Defendants also urged that, as to defendants other than 
the Estate, Island Green’s complaint is deficient and subject to dismissal under Rule 19 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the Estate is a necessary, if not 
indispensable, party.  We do not take a position on this basis for dismissal, but the 
District Court may consider it on remand.   
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of 
Island Green’s claims against Carmen Querrard and the other Defendants acting on 
behalf of the Estate, but we will vacate the District Court’s order dismissing the 
plaintiff’s claims as to the Defendants and entities acting in other capacities, and remand 
with instruction that the District Court grant plaintiff leave to amend its complaint.   
                                              
     
5
 It is noted that Ethel Bryan is alleged to have acted “as a representative of 
Defendants.”  Was she thus acting as a representative of the estate, or of individual heirs?  
